Mohammad Mahdi Sadrforati; Amir Mohammad Gamini
Abstract
This paper investigates the evolution of the concept orb in order to give a rational explanation for the concept's introduction and dissolution. This concept, we will argue, was initially introduced in the Greek culture, while suffering from some conceptual ambiguitites. In particular, two geometrical ...
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This paper investigates the evolution of the concept orb in order to give a rational explanation for the concept's introduction and dissolution. This concept, we will argue, was initially introduced in the Greek culture, while suffering from some conceptual ambiguitites. In particular, two geometrical and physical understandings were associated with the concept and they were indistinguishable among different passages. For Ptolemy, the concept of orb had both geometrical and physical realizations in different treatises. But such conceptual ambiguity was gradually eliminated in the Islamic age of science. We believe that this concept articulation was initiated from the early tenth century by the works of Ibn al-Haytham and Al-Bīrūnī and by the end of the thirteenth century ultimately the concept was used with its highest clarity. We will enumerate some key conceptual characteristics of the concept in this period in order to show how these components marked the beginning of its dissolution in the sixteenth century. In particular, Tycho Brahe and his fellow astronomers in the sixteenth century decided to abandon the concept for some contradictions between these conceptual components and their own empirical observations.
Mohammad Mahdi Sadrforati
Abstract
About fifty years ago Ernst Mayr, a German biologist, and philosopher of science reminded other philosophers of science of the significance of biology in philosophical studies. By the second half of the nineteenth century, the orthodox philosophy of science was still largely leaned toward physics among ...
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About fifty years ago Ernst Mayr, a German biologist, and philosopher of science reminded other philosophers of science of the significance of biology in philosophical studies. By the second half of the nineteenth century, the orthodox philosophy of science was still largely leaned toward physics among other empirical branches of science. It took some decades for philosophers of science to gradually change their focus to biology, but the course of action still needs development. This paper highlights some critical problems that biological case studies may pose against philosophers’ understanding of the language of science. It will be seen that at least for some biological case studies, scientific theory alone cannot determine meaning and reference. Contrary to the orthodox philosophy of science, causal and descriptive components are also insufficient to do the task. This paper reveals some reasons behind these biological complications but ultimately claims that above everything this complication stems from the historicity of the reference of biological concepts.
Mohammad Mahdi Sadrforati; Shadi Mohammadi
Abstract
Having ‘good sense’ in choosing among rival scientific theories was initially introduced by Pierre Duhem. According to him, where empirical evidence and logical rules cannot help to choose among scientific options, scientists need a further criterion to help them decide. However, Duhem left ...
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Having ‘good sense’ in choosing among rival scientific theories was initially introduced by Pierre Duhem. According to him, where empirical evidence and logical rules cannot help to choose among scientific options, scientists need a further criterion to help them decide. However, Duhem left this notion undeveloped and open for further discussions to find its nature and the way it works. This paper starts with evaluating David Stump’s and Milena Ivanova’s accounts, two major scholars in this debate. Having considered the cons and pros of each account, we will come up with a social understanding of ‘good sense’, according to which this notion is characterized by the way successful scientists actually theorize and practice science and the community of scientists accepts them.
Mohammad Mahdi Sadr Forati; Gholam Hossein Moghadam Heidari
Volume 4, Issue 7 , October 2014, , Pages 157-165
Abstract
Allan Franklin is a contemporary physicist and philosopher who take some sort of extremist opinion about the experiments in physics and the position of social constructivism. Proposing a philosophical model, which we call ‘Pragmatist Rationality’, Franklin wants to defend of a kind ...
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Allan Franklin is a contemporary physicist and philosopher who take some sort of extremist opinion about the experiments in physics and the position of social constructivism. Proposing a philosophical model, which we call ‘Pragmatist Rationality’, Franklin wants to defend of a kind of logic of scientific discovery and the possibility of crucial experiments occurring and through which He wants to rebut the contingency thesis which is a vital characteristic of social constructivism. Although he denies that he is proposing a kind of theory of rationality, such theory is evident throughout his works. In this paper we review and evaluate his claims and are going to measure its soundness compared to the contemporary social constructivism theories.
